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Abstract
Title: An Economic Development Policy for Cambridge;
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Author: Joe Carroll Litten
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Fachelor of Science at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
This thesis is a presentation of a particu.lar economic
development policy for Cambridge based upon an analysis of the
local economy and its external constraints. The analysis re-
veals that the two greatest economic problems facing Cambridge
are the loss of_ manufacturing employent and an unstable in-
dustrial mix, caused by the dominance of the universities and
durable manufacturing.
The policy focuses on these two problems. An analysis of
several strategies indicates that the most feasible alternative
is to attract industries which alleviate these problems. Cri-
teria are established which select industries that would be most
effective in providing employment for displaced workers and in-
creasing stability. Additional criteria are used to limit the
industries to those which might be attracted to Cambridge, per-
mitting a more efficient search for firms.
Lists of effective and efficient industries are produced
and recommendations are made for refining- the criteria and the
selection process.
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4Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
One of the major problems facing Cambridge is creating
and~ aintaining a strong local economy. A healthy, properly
functioning economy means more jobs, more tax revenues, higher
incomes and happier politicians. (All this and apple pie, too!)
Only the naive and the unelected stand in the way of economic
development. However, Cambridge can ill afford to woo every
prospective employer; its limited resources would soon be
expended. Its efforts, therefore, should. be directed towards
attracting those industries which are best for Cambridge and
at the same time might seriously consider locating there.
At this point the discussion could end for want of a
cause. -There is no "best" industry or group of industries for
Cambridge. A firm in one industry might provide 100 people
with P5,000 jobs whereas another firm in a different industry
might provide 5 people with $100,000 jobs. Still another firm
might only employ 10 people at o3,000 jobs, but create an addi-
tional 1,000,000 in property tax revenues to the city. There
is no objective way to choose the best alternative among these
until the purpose of economic development is defined. That
definition can and should be made by the legislative arm of
Cambridge, the City Council. It is the Council's responsibility
to evaluate alternatives and set policies. Once this Is done,
the duty of the executive branch, the City Manager and the
5agencies under him, is to carry out these policies' in an
efficient manner.
This paper is a presentation of a particular economic
development policy for Cambridge based upon an analysis of the
local economy, and the strategy that will most effectively and.
efficiently implement that policy. It will be argued here that
the purpose of economic development in Cambridge should be
1) To provide employment for the unskilled and semi-
skilled residents of Cambridge, and
2) To encourage stability in the Cambridge economy.
The significance of this policy lies in concentrating on the
above goals, rather than including them in a broad spectrum
of competing goals. For instance, it might be reasonable to
include the attraction of high growth industries as one goal
of economic development, but unless high growth industries
employ large numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled workers or
are very stable, such a goal would only diffuse the city's
efforts. Directing those efforts at a limited but well chosen
set of objectives is the best means of actually bringing about
development that will help the city. However, it should be re-
cognized that such a narrowly defined policy necessarily re-
flects subjective judgments which must be accepted-before the
policy itself is adopted. These judgments will be explicitly
presented in Chapter 3.
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6If. the policy is accepted as both legitimate and desir-
able for Cambridge, the problem of implementation still re-
mains.' It is argued here that the most effective program to
implement the preceding policy is to attract those industries
which:
1) Have a high percentage of unskilled and semi-skilled
workers, and
2) Do not have strong economic links to the universities.
The industries which will fulfill the above criteria are the
most likely to meet the objectives of the policy, b-ut they are
not necessarily the industries most likely to locate in Cam-
bridge.. A widget manufacturer might look perfect to the city,
but if he is unwilling to move here , nothing will come of it.
He must be induced to locate in Cambridge, either by market
conditions or subsidies. It will be shown in Appendix VII
that subsidies for this purpose are an extremely heavy burden
on a community with questionable results. Therefore, the city
will have to attract those industries which might locate in
Cambridge based on market conditions. It will be demonstrated
in this paper that the most efficient means of doing that is to
select industries such that:
1) The industry has high growth relative to other indus-
tries in the United States.
2) The industry has grown faster in the Massachusetts re-
gion than in the rest of the United States.
3) The likelihood is great that a firm in that industry
would desire a central city location.
(The industries which meet these criteria are the ones which
are most likely to be attradced to Canbridge. They are dis-
tinguishable from the previously stated criteria in that the
latter are designed to select industries Which are most effective
in fulfilling the stated policy objectives, whereas these cri-
teria, by selecting good prospects from among the effective in-
dustries, simply .Pake the search for specific firms more efficient.
Thus, failure to meet one or more of the efficiency criteria does
not eliminate that industry from consideration; it merely gives
that industry a lower priority since the risk of being unsuccess-
ful in attracting the industry is higher.
What is meant by "attracting industries" is designating
a full time staff which will advertise in appropriate trade or
professional journals, make formal and informal contacts, con-
duct mail campaigns, provide information and otherwise attempt to
persuade firms to locate in Cambridge. The underlying assumption
of this program of selecting industries and trying to attract
firms in those industries is that economic development is pri-
marily salesmanship. (This assumption will be justified in Ap-
pendix VII). Selecting industries is, in effect, segmenting the
market and focusing the sales efforts in areas with high potential
"sales." Attracting industry then becomes a process of "selling"
Cambridge to firms within the potential market on the basis of
its desirability for them. This means that factors which affect
that desirability must be inventoried and monitored to enable
"custoners" to make their decisions. Such an inventory and mo-
8nitoring system, although a necessary component of the economic
development process presented here, is beyond the scope of this
work and will not be developed.
In summary, the purposes of this paper are:
1) To present and justify a specific economic development
policy for Cambridge.
2) To outline how that policy can most effectively be
achieved.
3) To outline how that policy can most efficiently be
achieved.
In order to achieve these purposes, the paper analyzes the Cam-
bridge econoemy and the external factors which signif.icantly in-
fluence it.
Chapter 2
ANALYSIS OF THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMY
Introduction
Cambridge is undergoing significant changes in its economy,
its housing market and its population, changes which are at the
root of difficult problems facing its citizens and government.
Before solutions can be found to those problems, the changes*
themselves must be ennumerated and understood well enough to
evaluate the effects of suggested policies. The present dis-
cussion is not a comprehensive list of all of. the interesting or
important things that are happening in and to Cambridge; such a
listing would be endless. Rather, it is a selection of those
events which illuminate the policies offered in this paper.
Since those policies deal with economic problems, the abbre-
viated list will consist primarily of economic changes but
other relevant occurences will be included as well.
To place the local events in perspective it is necessary
to .review the contexts in which they occur; the backdrop of
national, regional and urban economic trends must be hung. This
is so because a local economy is affected by many external
forces which it cannot influence even with the aid of local
government. Important economic forces, such as the size of the
available labor force and the demand for products, are not limi-
ted by city boundaries. Additionally, in our federal system
local government is the weak sister of economic policy; many of
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the important economic variables such as interest rates are
outside of its legal domain. Other tools which are within that
domain such as taxation or expenditures on municipal services
are ineffective without either the cooperation of surrounding
municipalities and the higher levels of government or financial
resources far beyond those presently available. Failure to re-
alize this can re-sult in undue importance being attached to lo-
cal factors. For instance, the exodus of manufacturing firms
from Cambridge might easily'provoke criticism of the high tax
rate as a significant cause of that exodus. However, when
weighed against the long-run technological changes in manu-
facturing, the increasing importance of highway transport rela-
tive to railroads and the encouragement of new investment by the
federal tax structure, the influence of the local tax rate di-
minishes in -the manufacturers' decisions to move.. Knowledge
of such exogenous factors creates a better understanding of in-
ternal events and facilitates a more realistic assessment of the
effects of city policies on the local economy.
The Nation: Structural Changes and Econormic Cycles
The national economy influences Cambridge through both long-
term structural shifts, largely related to technological change,
and short-term fluctuations which are associated with business
cycles and national politics. Fortunately, the structural
shifts do not occur rapidly, and if properly monitored, at least
foretell the economic prospectus; they can be planned for in a
positive fashion, taking advantage of the favorable trends and 4
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possibly avoiding unfavorable impacts. This can be done in de-
tail due to the ample time for planning. Short-term fluctuations,
by definition, do not permit such foresight. They can only be
planned for in a tentative manner, contradictorally trying to
insulate the local economy against the ill effects of unemploy-
ment or inflation while keeping it open during periods of expan-
sion. Despite the inability to predict when and to what extent
these various events occur, they will certainly occur at some
point and judicious planning can at least dampen adverse impacts
or amplify desired consequences. Nonetheless, both the long-
term drift and short-term vacillations in the national economy
must be accepted as rigid constraints in local economic develop-
ment.
Two major changes that are taking place in the economy and
have been at least since the turn of the century are the in-
creasing use of capital equipment which contributes to more
efficient production1 and improvements in transportation such
that its costs have decreased relative to other costs.2 They are
linked to several other significant changes. Decreasing trans-
portation costs have made it economically feasible to expand both
markets and sources of supply to a larger geographical area. Al-
though the cause and effect relationships- are not entirely clear,
this expansion of supply and demand coupled with capital's addi-
tional production efficiency has certainly created an environment
conducive to larger units of production and greater specializa-
tion among products. In fact, the average sizes of both the
physical and institutional units of production, factories and
firms, are growing. Specia"ization also has occurred. Not only
are there a greater number of distinguishable industries, but
they are becoming increasingly concentrated in particular re-
gions. 3
At least partially related to these trends are long-term
changes in the occupational structure. Much has been said about
the effects of automation on -jobs and the displacement of workers,
but contrary to popular opinion, the increased usage of machines
has not led to a need for more- skilled workers. In fact, un-
skilled and semi-skilled workers, which were 57.27% of the work
force in 1960, are expected to comprise 58.64% of the work force
in 1975. However, within that group the type of work is changing.
During the period 1960-1975 blue collar semi-skilled or unskilled
occupations are expected to increase from 33.797 to 37.68- of
the labor force.4  This reflects the growing importance of the
service, finance, government and trade industries in the economy
and the stabilization of manufacturing, at one time a significant
growth sector. Manufacturing output and jobs have grown but not
at a rate faster than the economy as a whole.5
The growing significance of the government sector is also
a factor in short-term economic fluctuations. Although employ-
ment within the government structure itself has remained fairly
stable, the subjugation of federal fiscal policy to volatile
political and economic viewpoints make industries linked to
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federal spending potential sources. of instability. An example
of this is the current cutback in federal defense contracts and
6
its effects on Massachusetts industries. Durable goods manu-
facturing can also create instability, although it is not
necessarily the initial cause as in the case of federal spending.
During periods of recession, consumer and producer purchases
of durable goods, such as refrigerators, cars or heavy machinery,
are generally the easiest and, consequently, the first to be
deferred., creating a drop in demand for durable goods. There-
fore, significant cutbacks in production and employment are
likely to occur, adding to the ill effects of an existing re-
cession. Such secondary cutbacks are less likely to occur in
production of nondurables such as food and clothing.. The impli-
cations for Cambridge of these national changes in production
and employment will be discussed in the summary at the end of
this chapter when they can be integrated with information about
the regional and local economies.
The Rep-ion: Slowing Down
Massachusetts, along with the rest of the New England re-
- gion, suffers from three major economic handicaps. First, a
dearth. of natural resources makes it necessary to bring them in
from other regions, and the additional transportation costs re-
sult in higher material costs relative to other regions. Simi-
larly, a westward shifting population has pushed markets farther
away, saddling finished products with higher transport costs as
well. Finally, a number of elements make production costs higher.
14
Labor wage rates are high, power sources are scarce and there-
fore expensive, property taxes in many areas are burdensome
and much of the state's industrial equipment and physical plant
is obsolete.7
Massachusetts' disadvantages are partially balanced by
several favorable factors. As one of the first "Andustrial"
areas in the country it has developed a skilled and stable work
force. A small but significant portion of that work force are
the highly trained and. specialized graduates of its fine un Iver-
sities. In addition, it has a relatively diversifi-ed industrial
structure enabling it to support new firms. The large markets
of the Washington-Boston seaboard region, although growing at a
slower pace than the rest of the nation should still be a sub-.
stantial attraction to demand-oriented industries.
Generally the net effect of these favorable and disfavorable
factors is.growth in employment and production in Massachusetts,
but at a rate slower than the U. S. as a whole. This has not
however, been true for all industries. The textile industry
and the shoe and leather industry have declined in absolute
numbers employed in the post-war period.9 Electrical machinery
and other defense-related industries have grown dramatically
in the same period, but recent cutbacks throw their continued
growth into question.10 These are just the most significant
changes in the industrial struct.ure; specific industries will
be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
The Cities: Moving Out
The two most salient facts about recent intra-urban econo-
mic'changes are that both people and manufacturing firms are
leaving the older central cities for the more spacious and peace-
ful suburbs. The possible reasons for the flight of the popula-
tion are numerous: wider spaces, better schools, lower tax rates,
less crime, fresher air, higher status, new jobs, more quiet,
fewer riots or just the availability of a plot of green turf.
But the pervading acceptance of these- or other reasons is evi-
dent in the movement to the suburbs. The corollary to that move-
ment should also be evident; the cities are left to those who on
an economic basis cannot afford the suburbs or on a racial or
social basis are excluded from them. The cities inherit those
who need more services, but are least able to pay. the taxes for
them.
At the same time manufacturing firms, once virtually the
economic raison d'etre of the cities, are moving out. Although
the subjective factors which motivated the exodus of the popu-
lation have probably influenced the manufacturers' decision,
there have been more compelling reasons:
As for manufacturing and its satellite activities,
the increasing volume of production and changing
technology, with consequent requirement for more
space, have made their move out to the periphery
of the metropolis imperative. Three technical
factors are at work: the increasing mechaniza-
tion and automation of production, which calls
for more floor area per worker; a switch from
the traditional multistory lof t building to the
one-story plant, which demands more ground area;
the new practice of providing open land around the
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plant for parking, landscaping, and plant expan-
sion. The combined effect of these three factors
has been to raise the amount of land per worker
in the modern factory as much as 100 times over
that occupied by the old loft building.1 i
It is the technological nature of these developments which makes
them virtually irreversible. Public policy, even the higher
taxes of the inner cities, seems to play a small role here.
Keeping these national, regional and urban economic factors
in mind, let us consider the changes that have been taking place
in Cambridge.
Cambride: Multiple Problems
There are major changes taking place in the composition of
Cambridge's population, its housing market and its industrial
structure. Complicating these economic and demographic changes
and at least partially linked to them are the city's fiscal
troubles. Those various trends combine t.o increase the complex-
ity of Cambridge's problems and at the same time to limit the
available solutions.
Like most other central cities in older metropolitan areas,
Cambridge is losing residents. Since 1950, its population has
declined from 120,740 to 100,361 in 1970.. An even. greater
decline has occurred in the family population (related persons
living in the same household), going from 99,849 to 66,243
during the same period. This has been due in part to a decline
in family size from 3.5 to 3.2 persons per family. However,
there has also been a net out-migration of 7,790 families
which accounts for the greatest part of the loss of family pop-
ulation. This has been reflected in the age distribution as well.
Of the total population the only age group that has increased
has been the young- adult group (18-34 years); -the number of child-
ren, middle aged and elderly has declined.1 2 These statistics
simply confirm what long-time Cambridge residents have said re-
peatedly; families are leaving the city and being replaced by.
students and young professionals. Individuals familiar with the
Cambridge housing market attribute this trqnd-to the greater a-
bility of the latter groups to pay ever-increasing rents. Since
1960 the average rent in Cambridge has gone up almost 901. ~ Stu-
dents, by combining their incomes,- and young couples, with
smaller families to support, could afford the rents, but the
older families were forced to move out.
Another contributing factor to the population changes has
been a shift in the industrial structure. Between 1956 and 1969
total employment in Cambridge grew from 77,900 to 91,600, an in-
crease of almost 14,000. However, 12,000 of these new jobs were
accounted for by the universities, wholesale-retail trade and
the service sector. Manufacturing employment, on the other hand,
declined by about 5,000 during the same period. In addition,
from 1969 to 1971, 64 more manufacturing firms left Cambridge
while only 10 manufacturing firms moved to Cambridge, creating
a net loss of another 2,600 jobs. The other sectors increased
slightly in employment with the exception of construction which
declined. by just one hundred.'- Thus, while total employment
has gone up, the distributioll of employment has changed drama-
tically. To the extent that ob availability affects choice
of residence, those employed in manufacturing would have an in-
centive to move out of Cambridge; those employed by the univer-
sities, in wholesale-retail trade or the service sector would
have an incentive.to remain or move into Cambridge.
A closer look at these -rapidly growing sectors indicate that
they offer relatively few job opportunities in them for people
who were previously employed in manufacturing. In 1960, about
64f of those employed in manufacturing in the U. S. were un-
skilled or semi-skilled , the balance being managers, highly
trained professionals or skilled operatives. Assuming that
job losses for a particular skill level are proportional to the
number of jobs for t-hat skill level, the decline in manufacturing
employment would mean significant losses of low skill jobs. By
and large, natural employment growth has not replaced those jobs.
For instance, during the period 1963 to 1972, M.I.P.'s semi-
skilled workers only increased from 1,302 to 1,385.(See Appen-
dix VI). Although detailed historical data was not available
for the service sector, .1970 Dun and Pradstreet Mylarket Indicators
show that just under half of employment in this sector is in
* For the remainder of this paper the terms "low skill" or
"semi-skilled" will mean "unskilled and semi-skilled4 unless
otherwise noted.
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research and development or business consulting firms, neither
of which would be likely to employ large numbers of semi-skilled
workers. The single growth sector which would provide such em-
ployment is wholesale-retail trade. In 1960, half of all jobs
in wholesaling were for semi-skilled workers and in retailing
the proportion was two thirds.1 5 Even so, the nature of the work
is so different from that in manufacturing that there may be
serious barriers to movement between the sectors. This will be
discussed in detail in Appendix VII.
A detailed examination of the manufacturing sector itself
also reveals some problems. In 1960, employment in non-durable
manufacturing was 14,650, or 60.4% of total manufacturing employ-
ment, but by 1970 that figure had dropped to 8,614, just 45.7%.
of total manufacturing employment.16 This means durable manu-
facturing has an increasing share of total manufacturing. As
previously discussed, a shift towards durable manufacturing in-
creases the instability of the local economy. Simultaneously,
much of the manufacturing sector is probably tied to the uni-
versities. Although there are no available statistics, persons
intimately acquainted with manufacturing in Cambridge characterize
both the professional and scientific instruments and electrical
machinery industries as being closely associated with the uni-
versities. These two industries, according to Dun.and Bradstreet,
accounted for 38.51 of all manufacturing employment in Cambridge
during 1970. This, too, is a po.tential source of instability
in that the universities' fortunes are largely subject to the
whims of the federal government.
Thus the city faces the multiple problems of losing many of
its families as a result of the pincers of rising rents and a
changing job market while at the same time suffering a movement
towards instability in its largest sector of employment, manu-
facturing. What are the resources that it can bring to bear on
these problems? Unfortunately, the- above discussion concerning
property taxes and municipal services for central cities applies
to Cambridge as well. Increased demand for services (in both
quantity and quality) and inflation have continued to push city
expenditures upward while infation has decreased the real value
of the tax base.'7 The natural consequence has been a spiraling
tax rate. This has only served to exacerbate the situation by
placing more upward pressure on rents arid encouraging additional
out-migration of industry. Barring an unforeseen Caesar who
would fill the general coffers, there is likely to be little
help available from the city to the city.
Summary of the Cambridge Economic Situation
Cambridge faces severe constraints on its economic de-
velopment imposed by national, regional and urban economic
conditions. These constraints limit the possible solutions to
the city's own specific problems. Moreover, fiscal difficulties
further limit feasibility even among the possible solutions.
I,
Conditions in the national economy have implications for
Cambridge's industrial mix, occupational structure and economic
stability. Decreasing relative transport costs and increased
size of physical plant make it feasible for firms to locate out-
side of Cambridge while giving them an incentive to do so. This
effect is amplified in the case of industries which serve re-
gional or national markets - a condition which, through increasing
specialization, is becoming characteristic of more and more in-
dustries. At the same time, manufactaring, the largest employ-
ment sector in Cambridge, has a decreasing relative share in the
national economy, giving way to the service, finance, government
and trade industries as the growth sectors of the future. Al-
though this has increased the proportion of low skill jobs, the
semi-skilled worker is being shifted from the factory to the
office as manufacturing stabilizes and these other sectors grow.
In Cambridge, which has relied so heavily on manufacturing jobs
in the past, this means its less skilled residents will face
diminishing employment opportunities if they continue to seek
jobs in manufacturing. Moreover, efforts to obtain a greater
local share of those jobs would have to overcome strong structu-
ral changes - not impossible, but likely to be expensive. Con-
versely, attracting the new growth sectors would align with
equally strong trends. However, such an alignment. is not nec-
cessarily a panacea; the last minute loss of the NASA center
for Cambridge is a recent lesson on the unreliability of one
sector, government, despite its overall growth. This fact of
national life adds a precautionary note to pursuing the new
22
growth sectors, particularly since the local manufacturing
sector has become increasingly dependent on unstable durable
production.
Regionally, prospects for employment growth are relatively
poor. Relative to other regions Massachusetts is generally
an economically unattractive location. The major factors which
make it unattractive, lack of natural resources, distance from
markets and obsolete physical plants, could only be overcome by
large investments and therefore, will continue to make it un-
attractive. Cambridge, without a massive influx of funds, could
not hope to overcome those factors. The city can, at best', hope
to attract those industries which still find Massachusetts a
relatively desirable location or whose rapid growth overcomes-
locational disadvantages enough to produce net growth for that
industry in the Massachusetts region.
The ubiquitous retreat of people and manufacturing from
the center cities leaves little hope for Cambridge to recoup its
own losses. They certainly might be lured back, but certainly
at a price the city can ill afford (See Appendix VII). Any eco-
nomic policy which Cambridge might set for itself will have to
accept the fact that the forces which created this dual out-
migration might be diverted, but certainly not reversed.
Even facing these general problems, Cambridge has several
of its own. The presence of the universities, due to the clus-
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tering of students and young professionals around them, contri-
bute to the upward pressure On rents. Additionally, their influ-
ence is pervasive in both the manufacturing and service sectors
of the Cambridge economy where university-related industries ac-
count for approximately one-third and one-half of employment in
each of those sectors. The effect of this is essentially to
create a "company .town", substantially dependent on the univer-
sities. This in itself does not create a problem. However, this
"company town" effect, the dependence of higher education on the
federal government, the failure of employment growth to suitably
replace manufacturing jobs, and the increased instability of the
remaining manufacturing combine to create a local economy that is
potentially volatile. In addition, these circumstances place
undue economic pressure on semi-skilled residents through dimi-
nishing job opportunities, growing job uncertainty. and rising
rents. Moreover, Cambridge can muster few economic- resources to
deal with these long-term problems because it is already forced
to raise expenditures simply in order to maintain its present
level of services.
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Chapter 3
An Economic Development Policy for Cambride
Introduction
The underlying assumption in the following policy analysis
is that people who are systematically harmed by the normal func-
tioning of the economy and who lack the resources to overcome such
injury, deserve either protection against that injury or some
form of compensation from the rest of. society. The basis of this
assumption is that the society as a whole benefits if the econo-
my runs smoothly and efficiently, but the costs that are incurred
are unevenly distributed. A clear example of this concept is the
relationship between unemployment and inflatioi In order to
obtain price stability it is necessary to have a certain amount
of unemployment. Here, the minority which must remain unemployed
or go through frequent periods of unemployment are "paying" for
the price stability which the whole society enjoys. Unemploy-
ment compensation, although it serves other purposes, is also
recognition that unemployment costs, as a function of the econo-
mic system, should be borne by everyone rather than just a few.
It is this assumption which has compelled the following policy,
but accepting the assumption is not a prerequisite to adopting
the policy.
The Pronosed Policy
The purpose which the City Council should set for economic
development in Cambridge is:
1) To provide employment for the semi-skilled residents
..of Cambridge , and
2) To encourage stability in the Cambridge economy.
Thus stated, the policy establishes no specific objectives and
delineates no particular program. It is a statement of values
which includes a particular set of goals and excludes others.
Nonetheless, these goals are based on the preceding analysis of
the Cambridge economy and will be justified and compared to al-
ternative goals within the context of that analysis.
The most apparent reason for making employment 'of semi-
skilled residents a part of the economic development policy is
that manufacturing employment has declined, and, manufacturing
employs a high percentage of semi-skilled workers. Most of the
decline has been caused by firms leaving Cambridge, rather than
by cutbacks within existing firms. The movement of a firm to the
suburbs poses three alternatives to the firm's employees who re-
side in Cambridge:
1) Retain the same place of residence, and commute to the
new place of work.
2) Move to a new residence near the firm's newer location.
3) Quit working for that firm and seek a new job.
For the semi-skilled, low-income worker it is likely that each
of these alternatives will either not be available to him or sub-
stantially harm him.
If he chooses the first alternative, he will be commuting a
greater distance at greater expense to himself. This is further
aggravated by the fact that it will be imperative that he own
a car in order to commute to the suburbs, and it is likely there
was no such necessity when the firm was located in the city. A
study of Route 128 firms showed that 60% <f the firms' employees
used a car to commute to work before the firm moved to Route 128,
and 98" of them used cars af terwards.1S Car ownership and the
associated costs -may well prove an insurmountable barrier to con-
tinued employment with the firm.
The .second alternative also creates higher costs for the
worker. Although housing costs are higher in the city measured
on a per square foot basis, zoning regulations in the suburbs
generally require so much space that housing costs will be higher
in the suburbs. These zoning regulations, coupled with greater
effective demand for home ownership during the post-war develop-
ment of the suburbs', create a scarcity of rental housing in the
suburbs. Since renting has both lower initial and lower perio-
dic costs than those associated with ownership, the lack of
rental housing pushes the cost of relocation to the suburbs even
higher. The rental housing available is quite likely to be more
expensive than the older, more dilapidated inner city housing.
Another study of relocated Route 128 firms by Everett J. Burtt
showed that employees who-remained with the company did, in fact,
have to pay more for housing than previously.'9 These factors
combine to make housing costs a formidable obstacle to continued
employment with the firm.
'I
If the costs of the first two alternatives are perceived
by the worker to be too high, he may choose to look for another
job within the central city. Burtt found that 58% of the workers
who separated from relocated firms lived in the core city. The
typical worker who separated from the firm had less education,
more dependents, lower wages and fewer skills than the worker
who remained with the firm.20  In the context of a declining
local economy, with firms leaving rapidly and hundreds or even
thousands of displaced workers looking for jobs as well, his
prospects for a new job are dismal. For the semi-skilled worker
the local economy does not even need. to be declining to make him
worse off; a sufficient condition is that there be a declining
number of semi-skilled jobs in the city with a const.ant or rising
number of semi-skilled workers seeking those jobs.
The jobs which have been lost in the manufacturing sector
are not being replaced by the natural growth of employment.
Most new jobs that are being created are for highly trained,
predominantly professional workers. The one sector which has
created a significant number of semi-skilled jobs is wholesaling
and retailing where an estimated 2,000 such jobs have been added;
this only begins to replace the estimated 3,000 to 5,000 semi-
skilled jobs lost in manufacturing. In addition, it is likely
that jobs in retailing, because of their low pay and differences
in job styles, would not be taken by displaced manufacturing
workers.
2~
The conclusion, then, is that the movement of manufacturing
firms out of Cambridge has removed a large number of jobs from
the city, creating higher costs for workers who originally re-
sided here. In the case of semi-skilled, low-income workers
these costs are likely to be so high as to create unemployment,
thus causing greater individual harm than for persons in a more
highly skilled, more employable group. Also, since manufacturing
employs a higher percentage of semi-skilled workers, the number
of jobs lost has been greater than for skilled workers, so that
the costs to them as a group have been higher. Finally, the
failure of employment growth in other sectors to replace those
lost jobs and the continuing loss of manufacturing firms mean
that this group will probably face diminishing job opportunities
in Cambridge in the future.
The goal of stability is dictated by the shift of the manu-
facturing sector towards durables production and the near domi-
nance of the local economy by the universities, resulting in a
potentially unstable local economy. An increased proportion of
durables manufacturing creates the risk of locally amplifying
the effects of a recessionary economy, because of production
cutbacks that generally occur under such conditions. The greater
danger, however, lies with the universities. Not only are they
major employers in the city, they are also closely tied to large
portions of the service and manufacturing. sectors. Any cutbacks
in either their spending or employment are likely to have
serious effects on Cambridge. In view of their dependence on the
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federal government, such cutbacks must be treated as a definite
possibility. The previous examples of defense contracts and the
NASA site should be ample warning of potential instability. In
addition to simply reducing this risk, increased stability re-
inforces the goal of providing employment for semi-skilled
workers; in periods of high unemployment, these are generally
the first people to be laid off.
Alternative Policies
Several alternative goals for an economic development policy
are presented here and discussed briefly. This should not be
considered an exhaustive set of alternatives. They have been
selected because they are commonly mentioned as desireable goals
and they provide contrast to the proposed goals. Nor are these
alternatives given a full and fair presentation; each of them
deserves time and space beyond the limits of this paper. In-
stead, those features which distinguish the alternatives from
the proposed policy and which reveal their weaknesses are em-
phasized. The purpose here is not merely to knock down straw
men, but to have a background for contrasting the suggested
policy and to illuminate areas where subjective judgments were
made.
The first alternative is to promote the growth of employ-
ment in Cambridge. The basic idea here is similar to that of
providing employment for semi-skilled workers. Although new
jobs in Cambridge are not necessarily filled by Cantabrigians,
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increased accessibility to more jobs increases the employment
opportunities for residents. However, such a policy ignores the
capabi-lity of workers to fill those new jobs. Cambridge itself
is an excellent example of decreasing job opportunities for a
part of the labor force while total employment continues to ex-
pand. The choice of total employment growth does not necessar-
ily imply neglect of.that fact. It could be preferred on a
philosophical basis; the responsibility of policy makers is to
provide the opportunity for employment, and it is the responsi-
bility of the individual to prepare himself for it. Under this
philosophy everyone has equal opportunity, equal responsibility,
and equal capability. The basic premise in focusing on semi-
skilled workers, however, is that there are differences in
capability, at least under present conditions, and these create
unequal opportunities.
A second frequently offered goal is to attract or promote
the. expansion of high growth or technically sophisticated in-
dustries. The purpose of this is to achieve employment growth
in the future as well as the present ,by being at the leading
edge of the economy and avoiding the retarded growth of a matur-
ing industrial base. This embraces the philosophy of total em-
ployment growth, and would be subject to the same criticisms.
However, there is some evidence that high growth Industries
would have little effect on the local economy as a whole.21
In addition, high growth can sometimes mean high risk because
it frequently occurs in new, unproven markets. The producer
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of runless stockings must have had tremendous sales-- the first
year.
The final alternate objective is to increase the tax base.
The concept here is that enterprise, unlike housing, does not
bring along a bunch of kids who go to school and cost the city
a lot of maney, but it does pay taxes. So the more industry,
the less of a tax.burden for residents. There is apparently a-
great deal of truth to that. line of reasoning, even if a higher
usage of non-educational services is allocated to commercial land.
One thing it overlooks is that the people who pay more property
taxes (the wealthy) would benefit proportionally more. This is
a minor criticism, though. The worst effect such a goal could
have is that industries or firms would be evaluated on the basis
of the size of their physical plant rather than how many or what
kinds of people they employ. There would be a tendency to favor
office buildings over less dense developments which might be
more aesthetically pleasing and provide more "needed" jobs.
In a sense, the disparagement of these goals is too harsh.
Generally, pursuit of them would not be harmful to Cambridge or
its citizens. The point that hopefully has been made is that
they do not aim specifically at the urgent needs revealed in
the economic analysis. Perhaps the greatest calamity of their
inclusion in an economic development policy would be diverting
attention from those needs and diluting effects to meet them.
'I
Attracting Industries
Accepting the policy as stated does not imply a- strategy of
attracting selected industries. The goal of stability does leave
little choice; the industry mix could only be changed by adding
new firms or deleting old ones. The latter seems somewhat sui-
cidal, so in this case attraction is really the only viable po-
licy. Contrarily, reducing local unemployment among the semi-
skilled could be accomplished in several ways. -The options are
somewhat technical and are given a complete treatment in Appen-
dix VII. It is sufficient to say here that attracting specific
industries seems to be the cheapest means of reducing local un-
employment in a particular labor market. Other. options have
potentially greater effectiveness, but Cambridge's ptecarious
fiscal position dictates the pursuit of a more modest and less
expensive strategy.
Effectiveness Criteria
Given the strategy of selecting and attracting specific in-
dustries, it is necessary to establish criteria as a basis for
selection. The initial criteria should be designed to identify
the industries which are most effective in meeting the goals of
the policy. These are the ideal industries, just what the doc-
.tor ordered. No reference is made at this point to the probabi-
lity of attracting them.
The industries which would be most effective in achieving
the designated policy,
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1)- Have a high percentage of semi-skilled works, and
2) Do not have strong economic links to the universities.
As previously discussed, simply increasing the number of jobs
available in Cambridge does not guarantee them for. Cambridge re-
sidents; it simply increases the job opportunities. Although
it is impossible to determine how many of these new jobs would go
to residents, if they qualified for the work their greater- access-
ibility should give them a significant portion of the jobs.
Selecting industries which have a high proportion of jobs
with low skill requirements takes care of the qualification fac-
tor and allows accessibility to run its course.- Selecting cri-
teria for stability is not so straightforward. There are two
centers of potential instability in Cambridge, durable manufac-
turing and the universities. However, manufacturing industries
generally employ large percentages of semi-skilled workers, and
the availability of labor with experience in manufacturing in-
creases the likelihood of attracting those industries. In the
interest of achieving both parts of the policy, durable manufac-
turing was not eliminated. The universities, on the other hand,
employ relatively few semi-skilled people. In addition, Cam-
bridge's role as an educational center hardly needs publicity;
its reputation is global. Therefore, university-related indus-
tries were excluded.
Efficiency Criteria
Once the effective industries are chosen they should be dis-
tinguished on the basis of how easily they might be attracted to
Cambridge. This permits a more efficient use of time and money;
there is no benefit in pursuing a high risk objective when there
are equally desirable, but low risk objectives. The criteria
used to make this- distinction were to choose industries such
that:
1) The industry has high growth relative to other industries
in the United States.
2) The industry has grown faster in the Massachusetts re-
gion than in the rest of the United States.
3) The likelihood is great that a firm in that industry
would desire a central city location.
Firms in high growth industries have an increasing need for
new facilities, new markets and, therefore, new locations. This
means that these firms only need to be persuaded to locate ra-
ther than relocate in many cases. This is easier to do since
they are seeking a new location and are not as concerned with
giving up their existing facilities.
In making location decisions, most firms select a region
22
first, either formally or informally. If the region does not
meet the needs of the firm in terns of markets, raw materials
or other factors, it is unlikely that -a particular location with-
.in that region can supply them. So if a firm is not attracted
to the region, the chances of bringing it to Cambridge are dimi-
nished.
Whereas growth and regional share are related to " coarse'"
variables and appropriately measured at a high level of aggrega-
tion, location within an urban area is a very specific and detail-
ed decision. Thus any evaluation of an industry's disposition
towards inner city location is more appropriately made in an
industry by industry analysis, based on at least some knowledge
of the industries' cost structures, marketing. patterns and other
intimate information. Such detail is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, this criterion was included because it is an
integral part of the selection process, and should be consciously
applied in the final analysis.
Selection of Industries
The effectiveness criteria were operationalized using Bureau
23of Labor Statistics manpower projections for 1975 , and the 1958
24Input-Output study of the Department of Commerce. (See Appen-
dices II, III, IV, and V) The industries which met the estab-
lished. parameters are listed in Table I.
According to the BLS projections, the percentage of total
jobs classified as semi-skilled will be 59' in 1975. In order
to achieve a higher than average proportion of semi-skilled jobs
in new industries, 50. low skill jobs was the minimum criterion
established.
Table I
EFFECIIVE INDUSTRIES
Industry categoryi Industry names2
Lumber, wood and furniture mfg.
Electrical and other machinery
mfg.
Motor vehicles and equipment
mfg.
Other transportation equipment
mfg.
Textile mill products mfg.
Apparel mfg.
Chemicals and allied products
mfg.
Leather and related products
mfg.
Miscellaneous and other mfg.
Transportation, communications
and public utilities
Services
Public administration
Furniture and fixtures mfg.
Electrical machinery, equip-
ment and supplies mfg.
MIisc. machinery mfg.
Motor vehicles and equipment
mfg.
Railroad and other transpor-
tation equipment mfg.
Textile mill products mfg.
Apparel and related products
. mfg.
Synthetic fibers mfg.
Paints, varni shes and rela-
ted products mfg.
Leather tanning and finishing
Footwear, except rubber mfg.
All other leather products afg.
Glass and glass products mfg.
Cement, concrete and plaster
mfg.
Structural clay products mfg.
Pottery and related products
mfg.
Misc. nonmetals and stone
products mfc.
Fabricated metals products mfg.
Paperboard containers and
boxes mfg.
Miscellaneous mfg.
Telephone
Telegraph
Private household services
Postal services
'I
Table II
EFFICIENT INDUSTRIES
Industry categoryi Industry names2
Ele-ctrical and other machinery
mf g.
Other transportation equipment
mfg.
Apparel mfg.
Chemicals and allied products
mfg.
Miscellaneous and other mfg.
Transportation, communications
and public utilities
Public administration
Electrical machinery, equip-
ment and supplies mfg.
Misc. machinery mfg.
Railroad and other transport-
ation equipment mfg.
Apparel and related products
mfg.
Synthetic fibers mfg.
Paints, varnishes and related
products mfg.
Glass and glass products mfg.
Cement, concrete and plaster
mfg.
Structural clay products mfg.
Pottery and related products
mfg.
Misc. nonmetals and stone
products mfg.
Fabricated metals products
mfg.
Paperboard containers and
boxes mfg.
'Miscellaneous mfg.
Telephone
-Telegraph
Postal services
1. These are the classifications used in Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Profile and Analysis of Economic Data
for Miassachusetts, 7oston, 1960.
2. These are the classifications used in U. S. Department of
Labor, Tomorrow' s 2anpower Needs - Volume IV: The National
In dustry - Cccu ational V'atrix and Other iManpower D;ata,
Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969.
They are less aggregated than Profile and. Analysis.
The input-output tables measure the effect that a change
in final demand for a given industry has on all other industries.
Both the forward and backward (supply and demand) linkages are
established on a national level for each of 82 industrial classi-
fications. For instance, for every additional thousand dollars
of final demand required from the research and development in-
dustry, the medical, eduactional and nonprofit organizations in-
dustry has to produce .104.27 of additional output. This is a
forward linkage for the latter industry. A backward linkage for
this industry occurs when for each additional thousand dollars
of final demand from it, the real estate and rental industry must
produce "83.16 of additional output. Using these tables as a
measure of dependence of other industries, a coefficient of .005
(C45 per "1,0O of final demand) was set as the maximum dependence
of an industry on the medical, educational and non-profit organi-
zations industry.
Either of these parameters can be criticized on the basis of
the inadequacy, age or level of aggregation of the supporting
data or the exact levels of the parameters themselves. The data
was the best available, but any improvements would strengthen
the validity of the results. The levels of the parameters nec-
cessarily have an element of discretion and should be varied if
the results they give are irreconcilable with other information.
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The efficiency criteria of high growth and regional share
were applied to the effective industries based on their 1950 -
1960 growth relative to other industries and the rest of the
U. S. (See Appendix I). The industries' propensities for an
inner city location are briefly discussed in Chapter 4. None
of the effective industries met both criteria. Since these cri-
teria were designed to narrow the number of industries rather
than eliminate them from consideration, those that met one or
the other criteria were included in Table II, -the list of
efficient industries. Technically, the telephone and telegraph
industries should not be included, but the industry mix effect
was only slightly negative and the net rate of employment growth
was positive , so they appear in the table. Most of the other
efficient industries showed a positive industry mix effect and a
negative regional share effect. The single exception was appa-
rel and related products manufacturing which has slower employ-
ment growth than the average for all industries, but is growing
faster in Massachusetts than in the U. S. as a whole.
Chonter 4
CONCLUSION AND CRITIQUE
Conclusion
Taken at face value, the preceding analysis leads us to the
f ollowing conclusions:
1) Cambridge's options for an economic development policy
- are severely restricted by conditions in the national,
regional and urban economies and its own lack of fiscal
resources.
2) The two major problems in the Cambridge economy are the
loss of jobs for semi-skilled workers and increasing po-
tential for instability. The jobs have been lost largely
as a result of the relocation of manufacturing firms and
the instability has been caused by the increasing domi-
nance of the universities in Cambridge industry, and an
increase of durable manufacturing.
3) The goal of Cambridge's economic development program
should be to alleviate these problems, and it should con-
centrate strictly on that goal.
4) The most feasible program of economic development for
Cambridge is to attract industries by 'selling" Cambridge
rather than investing in large subsidies.
5) The industries which the city should try to attract are
several manufacturing industries (primarily durables),
telephone, telegraph and postal services. Before this
is done they should. be scrutinized at a finer level of
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aggregation, and the likelihood of their moving to a
center city such as Cambridge should be assessed.
There are substantive problems with this final conclusion for
reasons discussed below. However, the basic analysis and struc-
ture of the policy is a sound one which deserves refinement.
Critique
This approach to the economic development of Cambridge can
and should be evaluated on the dual basis of technical validity
and subjective values. This is so because it presents not only an
analysis of what is happening in the Cambridge economy; it also
presents an opinion of what should be happening.. Where possible,
the following critique will attempt to separate analysis from
opinion.
The most damning criticism of the approach is that it does
not take a broad view of the problems of economic development.
It immediately concedes a lack of resources, thereby severely
limiting the feasible solutions by imposing a severe although
indefinite budget constraint. This precludes a more thorough
examination of such fundamental problems as lack of training
programs and lack of mobility for displaced workers. The deci-
sion to do so was based on a personal judgment of realistic con-
straints and a need to confine the problem to manageable propor-
tions.
Another limitation is that the proposed policy is directed
at benefiting a narrowly defined segment of the population, the
semi-skilled and unskilled displaced worker. This is based in
part on the results of the analysis but also on the feeling that
these are the people who have grown up in Cambridge, are being
squeezed out of their neighborhoods and deserve jobs which will
enable them to remain where they are. One result of this.pre-
occupation with the semi-skilled population is that possible
structural problems between the skilled occupations have been
largely ignored. This amounted to an assumption that skilled
individuals would be able to make whatever transitions would
be necessary to overcome such problems. This assumption was made
more in the interest of brevity than realism.
Considering the technical aspects of the approach, there are
several shortcomings which must be considered when evaluating or
using the results. First, much of the data is either old or
unreliable. However, in every case it was the newest and most
reliable information available to the author. For instance,
employment statistics from the Division of Employment Security
are quite likely to exclude smaller firms , but they are the best
annual statistics available at the citywide level. Fortunately,
most of the analysis is not so refined as to be invalidated by
anything less than a gross error in the data. Another weakness
in the analysis is that it deals primarily with long-term trends,
treating short-term problems only superficially. Significantly,
the difficulties of mounting an economic development effort during
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a recession are never presented; this is largely due to the
author's feeling of incompetence in this realm and a bias to-
wards saying nothing rather than the wrong thing. Finally, the
most severe technical limitation of this paper is that much of
the data and conclusions may be at so high a level of aggregation
that both opportunities and problems may be overlooked. A
specific industry which might meet all of the criteria would be
ignored if it were included in a broader industrial classification
which did not meet the criteria. Likewise, the use of the broad
categories of "semi-skilled" and "unskilled"- worker~s neglects
many very real differences between occupations within these
categories. Nonetheless, the level of aggregation was the result
of weighing detail against usefulhess within the constraints of
time and available data; the level chosen is sufficient to
support the -policies and conclusions presented here.
The most severe substantive problem is that most of the
industries selected through the criteria are in durable manu-
facturing. Attracting them -may not be possible, since -most
manufacturers are finding Cambridge an unsatisfactory location.
One optimistic note is that durable manufacturing employment
increased from 9,612 in 1960 to 10,251 in 1971. Even if this is
an indication that there may be some success in attracting other
durables, the problem simply changes its face. The almost com-
plete dominance of the new industries by the durables sector
might create enough instability' to offset the benefit of new Jobs.
This dilemma can be solved within the context of the present
policy through one of two mechanisms:
1)- Relax the parameter for dependence on the universities.
There were many industries whose coefficient fell be-
tween .005 and .025. This is not an excessive degree of
dependence and might -well be allowed in the interest of
achieving stability.
2) Disaggregate the industries as much as possible, retaining
the same criteria and selection method... This might un-
earth sone industries which were previously hidden by
being thrown together with "undesirable" industries.
Whatever refinements are made in the policy., the goals of
economic development should remain the same: jobs for the less
skilled and stability for everyone.
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APPENDIX I
Relative Employment
Industries
Change in Massachusetts
4
1950 - 1960
Industry
Name
Industry
Mix
Regional
Share
Absolute
Growth
Agriculture
Forestry & Fisheries
Mining
Contract Construction
Food. & Kindred Mfg.
Textile Mill Product-
ion Mfg.
Apparel Mfg.
Lumber, Wood, Furni-
ture, Nfg.
Printing & Publishing
Mf g.
Chemical & Allied
Products Mfg.
Electrical & Other
Machinery Mfg.
M"otor Vehicle &
Equipment Mf g.
Other Transportation
Equipment Mf g.
Other Miscellaneous
Mfg.
Rails & Railway
Express
Trucking & Ware-
housing
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ +
4
Industry I
Name
Other Transporta-
tion
Communications
Utilities & Sani-
tary Services
Wholesale Trade
Food & Dairy Product
Stores
Eating & Drinking
Other Retail Trade
Financial, Insurance,
Real Estate
Hotels & Other Per-
sonal Services
Private Household
Services
Business & Repair
Services
Entertainment & Re-
creational Services
Medical & Other Pro-
fessional Services
Public Administration
Armed Forces
Industry Not Reported
ndustry
Miix
Regional
Share-
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
++
Absolute
Growth
+
-
+
+
+
+
+
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APPENDIX II
Total Requirements Per Dollar of Delivery To Final Demand For
Medical, Educational and Nonprofit Organizations Industry, 1958
Name Forward Linkage Backward Linkage
Livestock & Livestock .00799 .00899
Products
Other Agricultural .00194 .00791
Products
Forestry & Fishery .00186 .00056
Products
Agricultural, Forestry, ..00253 .00055
& Fishery Services
Iron & Ferroalloy Ores .00134 .00042
Mining
Nonferrous Metal Ores .00178 .00055
Mining
Coal Mining .00189 .00176
Crude Petroleum & .00142 .00688
Natural Gas
Stone & Clay Mining & .00174 .00073
Quarrying
Chemical & Fertilizer .00169 .00040
Mineral Mining
New Construction .00256
Maintenance & Repair .00146 .04314
Construction
Ordnance & Accessories .00258 .00094
Food & Kindred Products .00435 .02123
Tobacco Manufactures .00206 .00066
Broad & Narrow Fabrics, .00308 
.00405Yarn & Thread IMills
Misc. Textile Goods & .00264 .00212
Floor Coverings
Name Forward Lle Backward Linkage
Apparel .00292 .00248
Misc. Fabricated Tex- .00311 .00211
tile Products
Lumber & Wood Products .00246 .00390
Except Containers
Wooden Containers .00260 .00018
Household Furniture .00254 -00012
Other Furniture & .00235 -00015
Fixtures
Paper & Allied.Products, .00221 .01757
Except Containers
Paperboard Containers & .00250 -00392
Boxes
Printing & Publishing .00238 .03215
Chemical & Selected .00253 .01093
Chemical Products
Plastics & Synthetic .00265 .00272
Materials
Drugs, Cleaning & Toilet .00229 .02897
Preparations
Paints & Allied Products .00267 .00262
Petroleum Refining & .00224 .00948
Related Industries
Rubber & Misc. Plastics .00231 .00574
Products
Leather Tanning & Indus- .00182 .00014
trial Leather Products
Footwear & Other Leather .00240 .00033
Products
Glass & Glass Products .00214 .00177
Stone & Clay- Products .00217 .00268
Primary Iron & Steel Mfg. .00239 . 00595
Name Forward Linkag Backward Linkage
Primary Nonferrous- ,.00233 
.00458
Metals Mfg.
Metal Containers .00261 .00131
Heating, Plumbing & .00251 .00259
Structural Metal Prod.
Stamping, Screw Machine .00239 .00219
Products & Bolts
Other Fabricated Metal .00230 .00248
Products
Engines & Turbines .00296 .00045
Farm Machinery & Equip- .00241 .00039
ment
Construction, Mining & .00239 .00036
Oil Field Machinery
Materials Handling Ma- .00241 .00010
chinery & Equipment
Metalworking Machinery & .00212 .00080
Equipment
Special Industry Machinery .00234 .00048
& Equipment
General Industrial Ma- ,00233 .00062
chinery & Equipment
Machine Shop Products .00219 .00053
Office, Computing & Ac- .00190 .00137
counting Machines
Service Industry Machines .00254 .00039
Electric Industrial Equip- .00226 .00147
ment & Apparatus
Household Appliances .00243 .00052
Electric Lighting & .00228 .0073
Wiring Equipment
Radio, Television & .00244 .00155
Comrunication Equipment
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Name
Electronic Compo-
nents & Accessories
Misc. Electrical Machi-
nery, Equipment &
Supplies
Motor Vehicles &
Equipment
Aircraft & Parts
Other Transportation
Equipment
Scientific & Controlling
Instruments
Optical, Ophthalmic &
& Photographic Equipment
Misc. Manufacturing
Transportation & Ware-
housing
Communications; Except
Radio & Television
Broadcasting
Radio & TV Broadcasting
Electric, Gas, Water &
Sanitary Services.
Wholesale & Retail Trade
Finance & Insurance
Real Estate & Rental
Hotels; Personal & Repair
Services Except Auto
Business Services
Research & Development
Automobile Repair & Ser-
vices
Amusements
orward Llnkaf!n
.00235
.00233
.00278
.00224
.00254
.00231
.00212
.00235
.00172
.00125
.00193
.00159
.00168
.00731
.00134
.00191
.00136
.10427
.00222
.00204
Rackward Linkage
.00115
.00088
.00200
.00153
-00138
*01307
.00424
. 00401
.02586
-01231
.00262
-02821
.03671
.02369
.08316
.00951.
.04172
.00185
.00418
.00645
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Nane Forward Linkage Backward Linka e
Medical, Educational 1.01414 1.01414
Services & Nonprofit
Organizations
Federal Governnent .00120 .00402
Enterprises
State & Local Govern- .00084 .00555
xent Enterprises
Gross Imports of Goods .00928
& Services
Business Travel, Enter- .00812 .02430
tainment & Gifts
Office Supplies .00233 .. 00496
3;'
APPENDIX III
1958 Transactions Eetween Medical, Educational And Nonprofit
Organizations Industry And All Other Industries
Forward Linkage
(195 )
Nano (-10 )
Backward Linkage
(195g)
(SlO )
Livestock & Livestock
Products
Other Agricultural
Products
Forestry & Fishery
Products
Agricultural, Forestry,
& Fishery Services
Iron & Ferroalloy Ores
Mining
Nonferrous Metal Ores
Mining
Coal Mining
Crude Petroleum &
Natural Gas
Stone & Clay Mining &
Quarrying
Chemical & Fertilizer
Mineral M-ining
New Construction
Maintenance & Repair
Construction
Ordnance & Accessories
Food & Kindred Products
Tobacco Manufactures
Broad & Narrow Fabrics, Yarn
& Thread Mills
142
12
5
5
1
1
1
1
3 ( *)
9
1
(*)
58
10
5
680
64
6
170
11
(*)
2
I,
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Forward Linkage Backward Linkage
9586 (1956q
Misc. Textile Goods & 2 23
Floor Coverings
Apparel 16 38
Misc. Fabricated Tex- 2 34
tile Products
Lumber & Wood Products, 9 3
Except Containers
Wooden Containers (*)
Household Furniture 4
Other Furniture & Fix- 2
tures
Paper & Allied Products, 10 85
Except Containers
Paperboard Containers & 4 20
Poxes
Printing & Publishing 14 322
Chemical & Selected Chemi- 11 4
cal Products
Plastics & Synthetic Ma- 4
terials
Drugs, Cleaning & Toilet 6 588
Preparations
Paints & Allied Products 2
Petroleum Refining & Re- 16 70
lated Industries
Rubber & Misc. Plastics 7 64
Products
Leather Tanning & Indus- 1
trial Leather Products.
Footwear & Other Leather 4 3
Products
Glass & Glass Products 2 6
For
Na me
Stone & Clay Products
Primary Iron & Steel Mfg.
Primary Nonferrous Metals
Mifg.
Metal Containers
Heating, Plumbing &
Structural Metal Prod.
Stanpings, Screw Machine
Products & Bolts
Other Fabricated Metal Prod.
Engines & Turbines
Farm Machinery & Equipment
Construction, Mining & Oil
Field Machinery
Materials Handling Machi-
nery & Equipment
Metalworking Machinery &
Equipment
Special Industry Machinery
& Equipnent
General Industrial Machi-
nery & Equipment
Machine Shop Products
Office, Computing & Ac-
counting Machines
Service Industry Machines
Electric Industrial Equip-
ment & Apparatus
Household Appliances
Electric Lighting & Wiring
Equipment
ward Linkage
(195q)
(" 100)
8
20
9
Backward Linkage
(1958)(41o6)
2
8
4
6
2
2
3
20
(*)
1
3
2
'4
(*)
3
2
2
2
5
4
2 (*)
For
Nlam 0
Radio, Television &
Communication Equipment
Electronic Components
& Accessories
Misc. Electrical Machi-
nery, Equipment &
Supplies
Mlotor Vehicles &
Equipment
Aircraft & Parts
Other Transportation
Equipment
Scientific & Controlling
Instruments
Optical, Ophthalmic &
Photographic Equipment
Misc. Nanufacturing
Transportation & Ware-
housing
Communications; Except Radio
& Television Eroadcasting
Radio & TV Broadcasting
Electric, Gas, Water &
Sanitary Services
Wholesale & Retail Trade
Finance & Insurance
Real Estate & Rental
Hotels, Personal & Repair
Services Except Auto
Business Services
Research & Development
ward Linka ge
(1956)
(6106)
6
Backward Linkage
(195 )
(U100)
11
3
1 12
23
12
4
2
20
2603
2
6
31
32
120
1909.
1
17
95
140,
38
12
4
539
420
265
1,557
110
5?3
40
55
Forward Linkage Backward Linkage
(1958) (1958)
Name (110) (>106)
Automobile Repair & 8 49
Services
Amusements 5 .83
Medical, Educational Ser- 296 296
vices & Nonprofit Organi-
zations
Federal Government 16
Enterprises
State & Local Govern- (*) 12
ment Enterprises
Gross Imports of Goods - 5
& Services
Business Travel, Enter- 36 444
tainment & Gifts
Office Supplies 87
Intermediate Inputs, . 7,241
Totals
Value Added 15,462
Total 22,703
* Less than 500,000
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Percentage of Unskilled And Semi-Skilled Workers By Industry, 1960
Clerical Operatives
2 .& &
Industry Total Kindred Sales Kindred Service Laborers
Construction 31 4 * 8 1 18
Furniture & 66 10 * 49 2 5
Fixtures
Glass & Glass 75 11* 53 2 9
Products
Cement, Concrete 67 9 * 40 1 16
& Plaster
Structural Clay 77 7 * 36 1 33
Products
Pottery & Rela- 80 9 * 60 2 10
ted Products
Misc. Nonmetallic 65 14 * 40 2 9
Mineral & Stone
Products
Fabricated Metal 58 14 * 37 2 5
Products
Office Machinery 50 15 * 33 1 1
Misc. Machinery 53 13 * 35 2 3
Electrical Machi- 60 15 * 41 . 2 2
nery, Equipment
& Supplies
Motor Vehicles & 68 10 * 52 2 4
Equipment
Aircraft & Parts 48 18 * 27 2 1
Railroad & Other 60 12 * 39 2 7
Transportation
Equipment
Instruments & .52 18 * 32 2 1
Fire Control
Equipment
Clerical Operatives
& &
Indutry Total Kindred Sales Kindred Service Laborers
Watches & Clock 67 14 * 51 1 1
Devices
Misc. Mfg. 67 13 * 49 2 3
Meat Products 80 10 * 57 2 11
Dairy Products 73 12 * 52 2 7
Canning, Preser- 76 14 * 48 3 12
ving & Freezing
Bakery Products 56 9 * 39 4 4
Beverage Indus- 66 11 * 41 2 12
tries
Other Food 71 13 * 43 4 11
Products
Textile Mill 83 8 * 68 2 5
Products
Apparel & Rola- 87 8 * 77 1 1
ted Products
All Other Paper 71 15 * 49 2 5
Products
Paperboard Con- 73 12 * 52 2 7
tainers & Boxes
Printing, Publi- 35 19 * 12 1 1
shing, & Allied
Products
Synthetic Fibers 62 8 * 47 3 5
Drugs & Medicine 51 21 * 24 3 3
Paints, Varnishes 59 21 * 30 .2 ?
& Related Prod.
Other Chemicals 55 15 * 29 3 8
Rubber Products 69 13 * 52 2 1
Misc. Plastic 76 12 * 54 7 3
Products
Industry
Clerical
&
Total Kindred Sales
Operatives
&
Kindred Service Laborers
Leather Tanning
& Finishing
Footwear, Except
Rubber
All Other Lea-
ther Products
Railroad Trans-
portation
Local & Inter-
Urban, Except
Taxis
Taxis
Trucking
81
89
82
52
79
91
83
Warehousing 71
Telephone 60
Telegraph 72
Radio & Tele- 19
vision
Electric, Gas 45
& Steam
Water & Irriga- 53
tion
Sanitary Services 84
Motor Vehicles 39
& Equipment
Drugs & Chemicals 49
Dry Goods & 42
Apparel
Groceries & Re- 63
lated Products
7
9
10
20
12
9
12
21
56
65
15
24
21
3
24
30
28
15
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
58
76
68
20
59
81
59
23
1
5
1
12
2
1
1
14
2
5 12
5
0
0
3
2
2-
3
3'
0
11
24
1
1
7
14
50
3
4
1
10
30
11
14
12
38
594
60
Clerical Operatives
& &
Industry Total Kindred Sales Kindred Service Laborers
Elec. Goods, 44 30 9 1 4
Plumbing & Heat-
ing Supplies
Machinery & 34 23 * 7 1 3
Equipment
Misc. Wholesale 54 20 * 23 1 10
Trade
Building Mater- 57 14 22 13 1 8
ials, Hardware &
Farm Equipient
Limited Price 77 12 53 1 8 3
Stores
Other General 74 19 44 5 5 2
Merchandise
Food & Dairy 70 18 25 17 2 8
Stores
Automobile 44 11 22 5 2 5
Dealers
Gas Stations 58 2 1 52 0 2
Apparel & Ac- 68 12 44 7 3 1
cessories
Furniture, Etc. 55 15 27 9 2 3
Eating & Drink- 78 3 -1 1 73 0
ing Places
Drug Stores 63 9 34 4 13 2
Other Retail 59 12 31 11 2 4
Stores
Banks & Credit 71 65 * 0 6 0
Agencies
Stock Brockers 43 41 * 1 1 0
& Investnent Co.
Insurance 49 47 *0 2 0
Clerical Operatives
& &
indu Total Kindred Sales Kindred Sorvice Laborers
Real Estate 43 16 * 1 20 6
Private House- 100 0 0 1 89 10
hold
Motels & Other 74 10 0 2 61 1
Lodging Places
Laundry, Cleaning 78 13 2 60 2 1
& Valet Services
All Other Person- 86 3 1 6 76 0
al Services
Advertising 39 32 * 5 1 1
Other Misc. 56 28 4 9 15 2
Business Services
Automobile Repair 25 4 1 12 1 7
Services & Garages
Motion Pictures 47 18 3 4 21 1
& Theatres
Misc. Entertain- 61 8 1 2 41 9
ment & Recreation
Hospital 59 12 3 44 1
Other Medical & 42 23 * 1 18 0
Health Services
Legal Services 43 42 * 0 1 0
Educational 27 9 * 2 14 1
Services
Welfare & Re- 46 15 1 2 26 1
ligious Organ.
Other ion-profit 64 34 1 1 26 2
Organizations
Engineering & 21 17 * 3 1 1
Architectural
Accounting & 39 38 * 0 0 0
Fookkeeping
Industry
All Other Pro-
fessional Ser-
vices
Postal Services
Other Federal
Public Adminis-
tration
State Government
Local Government
Total All Indus-
tries
Clerical
&
Total1{Indrerdl
25
90
57
18
83
43
38
20
58
73
57
Operatives
&
Sales Kinrred Service_ Laborers
4
1
5
2
3
18
3
2
5
17
45
13
0
4
4
2
5
6
0
*
*
*
?7
Sales workers in this industry are not predominantly semi-
skilled.
1. S.I.C. codes for these categories can be found in Appendix
in U.S. Department of Labor, Tomorrow's kanoower Needs -
Volume IV: Thpg. NTational iustry - Occupational and Other
INanpower IData, U.S. Governnent Printing Office, Washington,
19369.
2. Categories may not add to totals due to rounding.
6)
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APPENDIX V
Projected Percentage Of Unskilled And Semi-Skilled Workers
Py Industry, 1975
Clerical Operatives
2 & &Industry1  Total Kindred Sales Kindred Service Laborers
Construction 32 6 * 12 1 14
Furniture & 66 10 * 49 2 3
Fixtures
Glass & Glass 69 10- * 52 2 5
Products
Cement, Con- 62 9 * 41 1 9
crete & Plaster
Structural Clay 72 9 39 2 23
Products
Pottery & Rela- 75 11 * 57 2 5
ted Products
Misc. Nonmetallic 62 12 * 44 1 5
Mineral & Stone
Products
Fabricated Metal 54 13 * 37 1 3
Products
Office Machinery 45 14 * 30 1 0
Misc. Machinery 50 12 * 35 1 2
Electrical Aachi- 53 12 * 38 1 1
nery, Equipment
& Supplies
Motor Vehicles 66 9 * 5 2 4
& Equipment
Aircraft & Parts 44 16 * 26 2 0
Railroad & Other 59 11 * 39 2 7
Transportation
Equipment
Instruments & 48 16 * 31 1 1
Fire Control
Equipn'ent
Industry
Clerical
&
Toal Kinred Sales
Operatives
&
Kindred Service Laborers
Watches & Clock
Devices
Misc. Mfg.
Peat Products
Dairy Products
Canning, Pre-
63
66
77
73
73
serving, & Freezing
Bakery Products
Beverage Indus-
tries
Other Food Prod.
Textile Mill
Products
Apparel & Re-
lated Products
All Other Paper
Products,
Paperboard Con-
tainers & Boxes
Printing, Pub-
lishing, & Allied
Products
61
63
64
78
87
65
69
35
Synthetic Fibers 54
Drugs & Medicine 41
Paints, Varnishes 53
& Related Products
Other Chemicals
Rubber Products
Misc. Plastic
Products
67
71
1
1
2
47
49
58.
53
50
46
43
1
2
6
3
7
15
14
11
15
14
9
10
15
9
8
2
8
6
3
3
3
2
4
2
1
2
2
1-
2
4
1
12
19
7
18
19
1
77
48
51
13
42'
19
28
31
51
49
3
3
2
12
15
2
2
5
2
2
2
.2
2
5
Clerical
Industry
Leather Tan.-
ning & Finishing
Footwear, Except
Rubber
All Other Lea-
ther Products
Railroad Trans-
portation
Local & Inter-
Urban, Except
Taxis
Taxis
Trucking
Warehousing
Telephone
Telegraph
Radio & Tele-
vision
Electric, Gas
& Steam
Water & Irri-
gation
Sanitary Ser-
vices
?otor Vehicles
& Equipment
Operatives
&
Total Kindred Sales Iindred Service Laborers
74
86
82
55
83
92
83
71
54
62
20
38
49
82
38
Drugs & Chemicals 48
Dry Goods &
Apparel
Groceries & Re-
lated Products
40
64
7
11
12
20
9
11
14
23
50
57
16
21
24
3
24
29
27
14
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
54
65
23
67
81
58
30
1
3
2
10
37
15
11
*
2
1
5
5
0
1
10
2
3
2
0
10
2
2
2
2.
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
9
41
3
3
1
8
65
Industry
Clerical
&
Total Kid a Sales
Operatives
&
Kindred Service Laborers
Electrical Goods
Plumbing &
Heating Supplies
Machinery &
Equipnent
Misc. Whole-
sale Trade
Building Kater-
ials, Hardware
& Farm Equipment
Limited Price
Stores
Other General
Merchandise
Food & Dairy
Stores
Automobile
Dealers
Gas Stations
Apparel &
Accessories
Furniture, Etc.
Eating & Drink-
ing Places
Drug Stores
Other Retail
Stores
Panks & Credit
Agencies
Stock Prockers
& Investnent Co.
Insurance
38
32
55
57
80
79
75
44
62
74
58
81
27
22
21
16
17
23
29
11
3
17
17
5
15
15
57
37
46
65
62
39
47
*
*
*
8
6
24
18 16
48
45
19
19
1
4
18
7
0 55
45
25
1
35
7
1
5
35 11
*
*
*
0
0
0
Real Estate 36
6
1
1
1
1
9
2
1
0
3
2
73
12
1
6
1
2
3
2
9
6
4
3
9
6
2
2
2
0
2
3
0
0
0
10 619 0
Industry
Clerical
&
Totnt 1K~indzad Sales
Operatives
&
Kindred Srvice Laborers
Private House-
hold
Hotels & Other
Lodging Places
Laundry , Clean-
ing & Valet
Services
All Other Per-
sonal Services
Advertising
Other Misc.
Business Services
99
74
79
92
39
59
Automobile Repair 32
Services & Garages
Motion Pictures
& Theatres
Misc. Entertain-
ment & Recreation
Hospital
Other Medical &
Health Services
Legal Services
Educational
Services
Welfare & Reli-
gious Organ.
Other Non-Profit
Organizations
Engineering &
Architectural
Accounting &
Bookkeeping
41
63
60
52
45
33
51
60
17
37
0
11
16
2
33.
28
7
18
01
0
0
3
1 59
1
*
4
3
9
1 17
3
8
11
25
44
15
18
34
13
37
*
*
*
*
1
*
*
86
59
2
86
15
1
12
1
0
2
7
17
.43
46
26
1
16
29
22
0
9,
Industry
Clerical
&
Total Kindigd Sales
Operatives
&
Kindred Service Laborers
All Other Pro-
fIessional Services
Postal Services
Other Federal
Public Adninis-
tration
State Government
Local Government
Total All
Industries
* Sales workers
skilled.
in this industry are not predominantly semi-
1. S.I.C. codes for these categories can be found in Appendix C
in U.S. Department of Labor, 'ITomorrow''s Evlanpower Needs -
Volume IV: The National Industry - Occupation a:l d Qther
Manpower Data, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
1969.
2. Categories may not add to totals due to rounding.
C3
20
82
38
327
89
49
53
70
59
*
0
*
*
*
?7
1
4
1
3
17
0
7
2
1
3
4
2
4
16
42
14
22
17
4
APPENDIX VI
M.I.T. Employment of Sei.-Skilled Workers
1963 and 1972
NON-AFL HOURLY
_12.
Reproduction Workers
Reproduction Worker B
Reproduction Assistant
General Helper
4
7
4
Animal Caretakers
Animal Caretaker
Jr. Animal Caretaker
1
Truck Driver
Truck Driver
Driver
Driver-Utilityman
Machinists
Shop Helper A
Shop Helper 'R
Stock Clerks
Sr. Stock Clerk
Stock Clerk
Photographers
Photographer C
Technicians
Lab. Assistant
9
2
1.
13
13
2
30
86 99
122
5
8
5
3
4
1
- 13
3
3
18
11
25
TOTAL
AFL HOURLY 12
Carpenter' s Helper 1
Mason-Tender 1
Maintenance Operator A 3
H & V Utilityman -
Glazier's Helper/Shademan's Helper 1
Fireman 2nd. Class 5 2
Fireman's Helper -
Stockman-Storekeeper 1 1
Senior Stock Clerk 1
Stockman 1 2
Head- - Swimming Pool
Swimming Pool Attendant 4 3
Garage Mechanic's Helper 1
Head Custodian 15 23
Polisher/Machine Operator 73
Custodian 125 176
Head Window Washer 1 1
Window Washer 5 4
Stagehand Custodian 5 7
Shipper 2 2
Shipper's Helper 2 3
Service Man 3
Sub-Foreman Custodian 3
Mailman 5 ?
Head Watchman 1 2
Watchman-Information 1
1~
AFL HOURLY 1963 1972
Watchman 19 25
Electrical Utilityman 2 10
Truck Driver 6 10
Spare Driver 2 1
Head Mover
Mover 5 7
Gardener 1 3
Ground sman 23 38
Night Cleaner - Light 12 4
Elevator Operator 3 2
Matron 11 16
Boatman 1 1
Boathouse Attendant 1 2
Head Houseman 1
Houseman 29 25
Linen Stockman 3 3
Handyman 4 3
Dorm. Maintenance Mechanic 5 6
Dormitory Patrol 6 8
Maids 4 7
Housekeeper 9
TOTAL 323 490
OFFICE IWEEKLY
Grade I
Grade II
Grade III
TOTAL
TOTAL SEMI-SKILLUED
Non-AFL Hourly
AFL Hourly
Total Hourly
Office Biweekly
TOTAL
19~63
301
.551
893
1972
12
201
583
796
99
490
589
796
1,385
86
409
893
1.302
j
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APPENDIX VII
Analysis of Policies to Reduce Unemployment
of Semi-Skilled Workers Caused by Relocation of Firms
Introduction
The primary reason that firms are relocating in the suburbs
is to reduce their production costs by avoiding the higher rents
and higher taxes of the city, taking advantage of the greater
efficiency of a new plant or having an abundance of relatively
cheap land for possible future expansion. One of the effects of
this relocation is to create unemployment among semi-skilled pre-
sumably low-income workers (see pages 25-27 in Chapter 3). Since
the causes of unemployment in this case are high costs of pro-
duction for the firm in the center city and both high commuting
costs and high housing costs for the worker, there are four poli-
cy options which might alleviate unemployment;
1) Subsidize firms to induce them to locate in Cambridge.
2) Subsidize housing in the suburbs to allow unemployed
Cambridge workers to move there.
3) Reduce commuting costs so that workers could remain in
Cambridge and commute to the suburbs.
4) Let niarket forces reach an equilibrium.
The following is an analysis of each of these options.
Subsidizing Firms
There would be two means of subsidizing firms:
(a) Reducing the firm's property tax.
(b) Paying an on-the-job-training ( OJT) subsidy at a
fixed rate per worker.
The first of these Could be 1ccomplished only through preferen-
tial treatment in property assessment since the tax rate applies
to all properties. This treatment could be given to individual
firms, industrial classifications or all commercial (non-resi-
dential) uses. The OJT subsidy could be paid directly to the
firm or to the trainees thus allowing the firm to reduce the
wage it pays them. Economically, the effect is the same.
Reducing the property tax by an amount equal to the differ-
ence in land costs between Cambridge and the suburbs would off-
set the advantage of locating in the suburbs. Assumiing that mar-
ginal costs (MC) are the same in both locations, this would re-
duce fixed and, therefore, average costs such that there would
be equal incentive for firms to locate In Cambridge and the suburbs;
Illustration I
Mc
AC
Mc.0
. 0
L
MCs 5 5
L
Cambridge
T
Suburbs
t=,(Cost of land in Cambridge) - (Cost of land in suburbs)
1C '=Cs
AC'=AC
However, there are several problems with such a subsidy. First,
state law requires that all properties be assessed at full value.
Although, as a practical matter, assessments are not kept up to
date, to make it public policy to deliberately underassess. places
the city in a very awkward legal position. Nonetheless, the
basis for assessment is so ill-defined that such a policy could.
be maintained sub rosa. As stated in one ;report, "Negotiating
the assessment of new industrial property solely at the local
level may produce a discriminatory tax system that is open to
abuse." Second, it is generally found that "... tax.incentives
are at best a relatively unimportant secondary factor of location.
Given the governing factor, the tax incentive may induce a speci-
fic location within the area defined by the basic factor."2 Yet
another reason for not pursuing this policy is that it would
probably be quite expensive to subsidize every new firm or even.
a few large ones. Finally, the most crushing blow to this policy
is that the suburbs could make retaliatory tax cuts, and since
they have the 'initial advantage of cheaper land Cambridge would
be likely to lose.
Paying an OJT subsidy to either the firm or the worker would
reduce the firm's marginal costs per worker. If the OJT program
is carried out properly it will also have the effect of giving
the worker additional skills and increasing his economic mobility
permanently. For the firm the effect of the program is described
by the following illustration:
Illustration II
43.
-I -A Ac
A Cs
L*L L
Cambridge Suburbs
(1) a net subsidy per worker
(2) MC0 =MCs
(3) M C'c=MCs-a
(4) aL*=total net subsidy
(5) aL*=FCc-FCs
Assuming the firm is in a perfectly competitive market such that
P=MIC=AC, then equations (4) and (5) would hold when the firm was
perfectly neutral between Cambridge and the suburbs. This policy,
.too, has its problems. Since marginal costs are being used to
adjust for fixed cost differentials, it is only at the equili-
brium point that both the Cambridge and suburb cost curve coin-
cide. Therefore, it would be more sensitive to market fluctua-
tions and the subsidy rate, to be maintained at an optimum,
would have .to be frequently adjusted. Also, the net subsidy to
the firm would be less than the actual subsidy the city would
have to pay. Most OJT programs have substantial direct costs
over and above the payments made to trainees and there are other
indirect costs such as supervision and lower productivity that
the firm must absorb. The net subsidy, a, in the diagram is
simply the difference between the compensation the firm pays. and
the total compensation the trainee receives less the additional
costs incurred by the firm. Hence, the sum of these additional
costs, the direct costs of training and the net subsidy per
worker would be the cost to the city in order to shift the firm's
cost curve. The benefits here are greater since reducing unemploy-
ment is complemented by upgrading- the skill levels of the trainees,
but it is a very expensive process.
Subsiaizing Housing
If the costs of living in the suburbs are greater than the
costs of living in Cambridge plus the commuting costs, then sub-
sidizing commuters is the better policy. If not, the following
situation exists:
Illustration III
14 AJ4GE OFr VkLI)ES
Cambridge Suburbs
7,F
(1) Ho=living costs in Cambridge
(2) Hs=living costs liP suburbs
(3) Ws=wages in suburbs for semi-skilled labor
(4) r-commuting cost rate
(5) d=distance from Cambridge to suburban location
(6) Hs!I Hc + rd
If subsidizing housing in the suburbs is to be effective, the
amount of the subsidy, Ha, would have to be greater than
Hs - Ws. In other words, if Hs t Hs'- Ha, then Ws2 Hs'. There
would be incentive in that case for the unemployed to move to
the suburbs and take jobs.
The basic problem with this policy is that those who stand
to benefit, unemployed workers in Cambridge, have nothing to say
about housing policy in the suburbs. The only means of con-
trolling such a policy is at the state and federal. level. Al-
though the federal subsidies exist and the Commonwealth has an
"anti-snob zoning" bill to aid the development of subsidized
housing in suburban locations, the combination has not worked.
Suburban municipalities have succeeded in selecting their own
subsidies, which means that housing for the elderly gets built
while low-income developments are restricted to the center cities.
A law similar to Massachusetts' has been in existence for some
time in New York and is apparently equally ineffective.
I,
Reducingr Commuting Costs
The situation would be the same as Illustration III except
that housing costs in the suburbs would be greater than housing
costs in Cambridge plus commuting costs, yielding:
(1) Hs2 He + rd
(2) Ws!: He + rd
In order to give workers an incentive to commute to the suburbs,
the commuting cost rate, r, must be reduced to a new rate, r'
such that:
(3) Ws- He + r'd
If this cost reduction is effected by improving mass transit,
then everyone using mass transit would receive the benefits',
making it a very expensive policy.. If direct travel subsidies
are paid, or special transportation provided for unemployed
workers, several questions arise concerning equitability. If
income 6riteria are used in awarding the subsidy, then all low-
income workers should receive it rather than just those who work
in the suburbs. Should the subsidy be enough for bus fare or
for operating a car? Subsidizing car ownership is probably too
expensive, but mass transit would be workable in only a few cases
since job destinations are widely dispersed in the suburbs. If
a relatively few job locations supplied a large number of jobs,
bus transportation specifically for those locations might be
justified. For example, if a large factory in Needham agreed to
hire 50 Cambridge residents, it might be feasible for the city to
provide bus transportation at cost for these residents, however,
such cases would probably be extremely rare and not a viable,
systematic means of reducing unemployment.
Relying on M1arket Forces
If the barriers to relocating or commuting in fact remain
rigid for a significant number of workers, then, in classical
theory, the wage demand curve will shift down enough to create
a marginal cost curve for the firm similar to MC' in Illustration
II. In an effort to obtain employment workers would bid down
wages sufficiently to "'subsidize" the firm and induce it to lo-
cate close enough f or them to work. However, minimum wage laws,
union wage structures and the welfare system tend to make wages
rigid downwards. Accepting this model, it is unlikely that
workers would be willing to accept a wage low enough to induce
firms to move back into Cambridge. Nonetheless, on closer in-
spection here is a policy which could overcome even this wage
rigidity.-
Illustration IV shows the effects of firm relocation on
the Cambridge labor market.
Illustration IV
\A/
Cambridge Market for Semi-Skilled Workers
b(1 ) Wi=equilibrium wage in period i
(2) Ni=equilibrium level of low skill employment in
period i
(3) S=supply schedule for low skill labor
(4) D1 =demand schedule- for low skill labor before reloca-
tion of firms
(5) D2=demand schedule for low skill labor after relocation
of firms
Since this is the low skill market, the equilibrium wage was
presumably close to the acceptable wage minimum prior to the
relocation of firms. The loss of firms is likely to have shifted
downward enough to have reached. the minimum, creating an in-
crease in unemployment of N1 - N2 -
The significance of this increase in unemployment is 'the
effect it may have on firms which were previously unwilling to
locate in Cambridge, as shown in Illustration V:
Illustration V
Supply-Demand Schedule for Firms Outside of Cambridge
(1) Si=supply schedule for low skill labor facing outside
firms before relocation
(2) S2 =supply schedule for low skill labor facing outside
firms after relocation
(3) D=demand schedule for low skill labor of outside firms
(4) n2=potential employment by outside firms
(5) Wi=equi-librium wage before reloction
(6) W2=equilibrium wage after relocation
Whereas the outside firms would have had to pay W1 before, they
can now get a good deal on low skill labor at W2 . However, Cam-
bridge has not been overrun by bargain hunting firms.
This could be so for two possible reasons:
(1) Wages and the availability of. labor are not important
factors in location decisions of firms.
(2) Firms which do consider these important factors,
and would locate in Cambridge on the basis of them
are simply ignorant of Cambridge's economic advantages.
Evidence from several reports indicate that wages and particu-
larly availability of labor are extremely important influences
on location decisions. 3, If ignorance is, then, a significant
defect in the functioning of the market, a logical policy would
be to eliminate it. This could be accomplished through any num-
ber of sales devices: media advertising, personal contacts,
letters, etc. The precise mechanism is of little concern here.
The point is that such a sales campaign, if the -analysis is
correct, is quite likely to have an impact if focused on the
proper industries. Moreover, it is probably the least expen-
sive of all of the proposed policies because it would require
a relatively small staff for a limited period rather than large
and continuous subsidies. It is, therefore, an excellent policy
in view of its likely effects and its feasibility, and should
be adopted prior to the other policies.
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